An optimal investment problem is solved for an insider who has access to noisy information related to a future stock price, but who does not know the stock price drift. The drift is filtered from a combination of price observations and the privileged information, fusing a partial information...

We show the existence of a continuous-time Nash equilibrium in a financial market with risk averse market makers and an informed trader with a private information. The unwillingness of market makers to bear risk causes the informed trader to absorb large shocks in their inventories. The informed...

Given a deterministically time-changed Brownian motion Z starting from 1, whose time-change V(t) satisfies V(t) t for all t 0, we perform an explicit construction of a process X which is Brownian motion in its own filtration and that hits zero for the first time at V(τ), where τ:= inf {t 0:...

We consider an equilibrium model á la Kyle-Back for a defaultable claim issued by a given firm. In such a market the insider observes \emph{continuously in time} the value of firm, which is unobservable by the market maker. Using the construction of a dynamic Bessel bridge of dimension $3$ in...

Given a Markovian Brownian martingale Z, we build a process X which is a martingale in its own filtration and satisfies X1=Z1. We call X a dynamic bridge, because its terminal value Z1 is not known in advance. We compute its semimartingale decomposition explicitly under both its own filtration...

Given a Markovian Brownian martingale Z, we build a process X which is a martingale in its own filtration and satisfies X1=Z1. We call X a dynamic bridge, because its terminal value Z1 is not known in advance. We compute its semimartingale decomposition explicitly under both its own filtration...

We develop a tractable model in which trade is generated by asymmetry in agents' information sets. We show that, even if news are not generated by a stochastic volatility process, in the presence of information treatment and/or order processing costs, the (unique) equilibrium price process is...

We consider an equilibrium model à la Kyle–Back for a defaultable claim issued by a given firm. In such a market the insider observes continuously in time the value of the firm, which is unobservable by the market makers. Using the construction in Campi et al. (<ExternalRef>...</refsource></externalref>

This paper has been withdrawn by the authors pending corrections.

Given a Markovian Brownian martingale $Z$, we build a process $X$ which is a martingale in its own filtration and satisfies $X_1 = Z_1$. We call $X$ a dynamic bridge, because its terminal value $Z_1$ is not known in advance. We compute explicitly its semimartingale decomposition under both its...