This paper considers the impact of finance on growth by exploring a model where entrepreneurs need both outside investors to provide funds and outside managers to operate the firm efficiently once assets are in place. We employ a repeated game framework which allows us to model outside equity as...

We study the relation of financial contracting and the pace of technological advance in a dynamic agency theoretic model. A firm which is financed by outside shareholders but run by managers has the prospect of a process innovation which arrives stochastically. Adopting the innovation requires...

This paper considers the impact of financial contracting on growth by exploring a model where entrepreneurs initially do R&D but subsequently need both outside investors to provide funds for capital investments and outside mangers to operate the firm efficiently some time after assets are in...

We study the relation of financial development and the pace of technological advance in a dynamic agency theoretic model. A firm which is financed by outside shareholders but run by managers has the prospect of a process innovation which arrives stochastically. Adopting the innovation requires...

We develop an incomplete contracts model to study the extent to which control rights of different financings affect corporate growth. The model admits a standard hold-up problem under equity financing; insiders may be disincentivized to do R&D because outside investors can use their control...

In this paper we study the pricing of credit risk as reflected in the market for credit default swaps (CDS) between 2003 and 2008. This market has newly emerged as the reference for credit risk pricing because of its use of standardized contract specifications and has achieved a higher level of...