Aims to give a view of the scientific production in the fields of Agent-based Computational Economics, mainly in Market Finance and Game Theory. Based on communications given at AE'2005 (Lille, USTL, France), this book offers a panorama of advances in ACE, both theoretical and methodological...

For any abstract bargaining problem a non-cooperative one stage strategic game is constructed whose unique dominant strategies Nash equilibrium implements the Nash solution of the bargaining problem.

This article provides an exact non-cooperative foundation of the sequential Raiffa solution for two person bargaining games. Based on an approximate foundation due to Myerson (1997) for any two-person bargaining game (S, d) an extensive form game G^{S,d} is defined that has an infinity of weakly...

This paper provides four axioms that uniquely characterize the Sequential Raiffa solution proposed by Raiffa (1951, 1953) for two-person bargaining games. Three of these axioms are standard and are shared by several popular bargaining solutions. They suffice to characterize these solutions on...