We consider a dynamic model of conformity that permits both a conformist and non-conformist equilibrium. We provide conditions under which conformity can 'invade' a population. More precisely, starting from a non-conformist equilibrium, we show that the conformity of an arbitrarily small...

We model a simple dynamic process in which boundedly rational agents learn through their interactions with others. Of interest is to study the process of contagion where by one action 'spreads throughout the population' and becomes conventional. We vary the network of player interaction between...

In this paper we analyse the effect that nai͏̈ve agents (those who take behavior at 'face value') have on the nature of social norms. After reviewing the use of signalling models to model conformity, we argue in favour of modelling nai͏̈ve inferences in tandem with standard Bayes rational...

We experimentally study the impact of framing effects in a repeated sequential social dilemma game. Our between-subjects design consists of two group level ("Wall Street" vs. "Community") and two individual level ("First (Second) Movers" vs. "Leaders (Followers)") frames. We find that average...