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The realization of uncertainty faced by workers over the lifecycle can be either public or private information. This has important consequences on the degree of risk sharing and ultimately on the degree of lifetime inequality. Recent literature in public finance has focused on the implications...
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We develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined. These cycles are driven by three political economy frictions: policymakers are non-benevolent, they cannot commit to policies, and they have private information about the tightness of the government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460305
This paper studies the optimal redistribution of income inequality in a model with search and matching frictions in the labor market. We study this problem in the context of a directed search model of the labor market populated by homogeneous workers and heterogeneous firms. The optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460509
Prior to 1863, state chartered banks in the United States issued notes -- dollar-denominated promises to pay specie to the bearer on demand. Although these notes circulated at par locally, they usually were quoted at the discount outside the local area. These discounts varied by both the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005069294
This paper studies the optimal redistribution of income inequality caused by the presence of search and matching frictions in the labor market. We study this problem in the context of a directed search model of the labor market populated by homogeneous workers and heterogeneous firms. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010737560
We develop a theoretical framework in which political and economic cycles are jointly determined. These cycles are driven by three political economy frictions: policymakers are non-benevolent, they cannot commit to policies, and they have private information about the tightness of the government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011123616