In this paper the scope of Bergstrom's (1982) results is studied. Moreover, his analysis is extended assuming that extraction cost is directly related to accumulated extractions. For the case of a competitive market it is found that the optimal policy is a constant tariff if extraction is...

Many economic problems can be formulated as dynamic games in which strategically interacting agents choose actions that determine the current and future levels of a single capital stock. We study necessary conditions that allow us to characterize Markov perfect Nash equilibria (MPNE) for these...

We consider a dynamic (differential) game with three players competing against each other. Each period each player can allocate his resources so as to direct his competition towards particular rivals -- we call such competition selective. The setting can be applied to a wide variety of cases:...

This paper yields sufficient conditions for Pareto inoptimality of controls forming Nash equilibria in differential games. In Appendix a result on existence of open loop Nash equilibria is added.

We propose a new methodology exploring Markov perfect equilibrium strategies in differential games with regime switching. Specifically, we develop a general game with two players having two kinds of strategies. Players choose an action that influences the evolution of a state variable, and...

How do families behave dynamically? We provide a framework for studying economic problems in which family behavior is essential. Our key innovation is the inclusion of imperfectly altruistic agents in an otherwise standard consumption–savings problem with exogenous income risk. This gives rise...

In this paper we analyze the dynamics of an R&D differential game allowing for technological spillovers and sigmoid learning functions of multiproduct oligopolies. We demonstrate how the presence of learning together with spillovers may generate a rich set of outcomes, varying from constant...

We develop a dynamic model of hospital competition where (i) waiting times increase if demand exceeds supply; (ii) patients choose a hospital based in part on waiting times; and (iii) hospitals incur waiting time penalties. We show that, whereas policies based on penalties will lead to lower...