Seit Beginn der 1990er Jahre kommt der Beschäftigung von osteuropäischen Saisonarbeitern insbesondere in der deutschen Landwirtschaft eine Schlüsselrolle zu. Obschon diese auf bilateralen Verträgen beruhende kurzfristige Arbeitsmigration mittlerweile Praxis ist, wurde ihre Bedeutung für...

This paper examines whether women benefit from working under female management using Swedish matched employer-employee panel data. I account for unobserved heterogeneity among both workers and firms potentially correlated with manager gender. The results show a substantial negative and...

This paper poses three fundamental questions about lifetime employment in Japan: How big is it? How unique is it? And, how is it changing? I examine different concepts and methods for estimating lifetime employment and conclude that it covers roughly 20 percent of the Japanese labor force. Job...

This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...

The aim of this paper is to examine rent sharing under a heterogeneous workforce using linked employer-employee Finnish data in 1987-1998 located in Statistics Finland. It is shown that rent sharing moderates firm-level wages and that the highly educated workers are the main targets. In...

We use matched employer-employee data to explore the relationship between employees' access to flexible working arrangements and the amount of informal care they provide to sick or elderly friends and relatives. Flexitime and the ability to reduce working hours are each associated with about 10%...

High-performance work practices are frequently considered to have positive effects on corporate performance, but what do they do for employees? After assessing the correlation between organizational innovation and firm performance, this article investigates whether high-involvement work...

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...

Employment contracts give a principal the authority to decide flexibly which task his agent should execute. However, there is a tradeoff, first pointed out by Simon (1951), between flexibility and employer moral hazard. An employment contract allows the principal to adjust the task quickly to...