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Standards and Incentives under Moral Hazard with Limited Liability
Reinshagen, Felix - 2012
We consider a model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent and effort that is two-dimensional. One dimension of the agent’s effort is observable and the other is not. The principal can thusmake the contract conditional not only on outcome but also on observable effort. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427619
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Die IT-Produktfabrik
Löffler, Markus; Reinshagen, Felix - In: Der Weg zur modernen IT-Fabrik : Industrialisierung, …, (pp. 53-60). 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009770362
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Der Wandel von der Projekt- zur Produktorientierung
Löffler, Markus; Reinshagen, Felix - In: Der Weg zur modernen IT-Fabrik : Industrialisierung, …, (pp. 45-51). 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009770365
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Umsetzung eines One-Page-Reportings : Executive Dashboards als Leitstände für Unternehmenssteuerungssysteme
Wippel, Jürgen; Mayer, Jörg H.; Reinshagen, Felix - In: Controlling & Management review / Sonderheft : ZfCM : … (2008) 2, pp. 42-53
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003749610
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Standards and Incentives in Safety Regulation
Reinshagen, Felix - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318836
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Standards and Incentives under Moral Hazard with Limited Liability
Reinshagen, Felix - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
We consider a model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent and effort that is two-dimensional. One dimension of the agent’s effort is observable and the other is not. The principal can thusmake the contract conditional not only on outcome but also on observable effort. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493825