We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard in a firm subject to stochastic growth opportunities. In our model, managers are dismissed after poor performance, but also when an alternative manager is more capable of growing the firm. The optimal contract may involve managerial...

We analyze how asymmetric information and imperfect competition a®ect liquidity and asset prices. Our model has three periods: agents are identical in the ¯rst, become heterogeneous and trade in the second, and consume asset payo®s in the third. We show that asymmetric information in the...

We develop a stylized model of efficient contracting in which firms compete for CEOs. The optimal contracts are designed to retain and insure CEOs. The retention motive explains pay-for-luck in executive compensation, while the insurance feature explains asymmetric pay-for-luck. We show that the...

We use asset pricing insights to study importance of micro-level frictions for aggregate quantities. In our model, the relevant stochastic variable is a stationary growth rate (necessary to produce high Sharpe Ratios in a Long Run Risk world), as opposed to a trend-stationary level of...

We investigate the hypothesis that shareholder empowerment may have led to more bank bailouts during the recent financial crisis. To test this hypothesis, we propose a management insulation index based on banks’ charter and by-law provisions and on the provisions of the applicable state...

We study economies of scale in banking by viewing banks as combinations of financial and human capital that create rents which accrue to investors and bankers. Applying this approach to annual data of US bank holding companies since 1990, we find much stronger evidence of economies of scale in...

We study dynamic general equilibrium in one-tree and two-trees Lucas economies with one consumption good and two CRRA investors with heterogeneous risk aversions and portfolio constraints. We provide a tractable characterization of equilibrium without relying on the assumption of logarithmic...

We develop a model of securitized (Originate, then Distribute) lending, in which both publicly observed aggregate shocks to values of securitized loan portfolios, and later some asymmetrically observed discernment of varying qualities of subsets thereof, play crucial roles. We nd that...

We propose a new theory of suboptimal risk-taking based on contractual externalities. We examine an industry with a continuum of _rms. Each _rm's manager exerts costly hidden e_ort. The productivity of e_ort is subject to systematic shocks. Firms' stock prices reect their performance relative to...

This paper provides first and second-order approximation methods for the solution of non-linear dynamic stochastic models in which the exogenous state variables follow conditionally-linear stochastic processes displaying time-varying risk. The first-order approximation is consistent with a...