In this paper I propose a regime switching approach to explain why the US nominal yield curve has been on average steeper since the mid-1980's than during the Great Inflation of the 1970's. I show that, once the possibility of regime switches in the short-rate process is incorporated into...

This paper develops a DSGE model in which banks use short-term deposits to provide firms with long-term credit. The demand for long-term credit arises because firms borrow in order to finance their capital stock which they only adjust at infrequent intervals. We show within a real business cycle...

This paper develops a DSGE model in which banks use short term deposits to provide firms with long-term credit. The demand for long-term credit arises because firms must borrow in order to finance their capital stock which they only adjust at infrequent intervals. We show that the presence of...

This paper develops a DSGE model where banks use short-term deposits to provide firms with long-term credit. The demand for long-term credit arises because firms borrow in order to finance their capital stock which they only adjust at infrequent intervals. Within an RBC framework, we show that...

Interest in TBTF resolutions of insolvent large complex firms has intensified in recent years, particularly in banking. TBTF resolutions protect some in-the-money counterparties of the targeted insolvent firm from losses that would be suffered if the usual bankruptcy resolution regimes used in...

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Credit growth is widely used as an indicator of potential financial stress, and it plays a role in the new Basel III framework. However, it is not clear how good an indicator it is in markets that have been financially liberalised. We take a sample of 14 OECD countries and 14 Latin American and...

Systemic risk is, by nature, unpredictable. Statistical models can fail to identify it. We need to maintain resource buffers as well as to implement better regulatory controls, and to improve managerial experience, and contingent strategies. International imbalances are nearly up to their...

The NYSE boom of the 1920s ended with the infamous crash of October 1929 and subsequent collapse in common stock prices from 1929-1932. Most approaches have suggested an overvaluation of 100%, usually dating from mid-1927 to September 1929.Excessive speculation based on high real earnings growth...