In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear–quadratic setup we show that...

In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear-quadratic setup we show that the...

In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear–quadratic setup we show that...

In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear-quadratic setup we show that the...

In a simple parametric general equilibrium model with S states of nature and K · S ¯rms |and thus potentially incomplete markets|, rates of super majority rule ½ 2 [0; 1] are computed which guarantee the existence of ½{majority stable production equilibria: within each ¯rm, no alternative...

An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the ¯rst date and a ¯nite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting { one share, one vote { and at ½-majority stable equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most ½ £ 100...

A general equilibrium model with uncertainty and production externalities is studied. In absence of markets for externalities, we look for governances and conditions under which majority voting among shareholders is likely to give rise to efficient internalization. We argue that the financial...

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