analyze how the equilibrium outcome depends on altruism and climate for ex ante identical individuals. We also consider (a …) coerced altruism, that is, situations where a social norm dictates how output be shared, (b) the effects of insurance markets …, and (c) the role of institutional quality. The evolutionary robustness of altruism is analyzed and we study how this …

mixture of true and coerced altruism between family members. We model families as pairs of siblings. Each sibling exerts … actuarially fair formal insurance. We show that coerced family altruism reduces individual efforts in equilibrium. However …, individuals always benefit ex ante from living in families with coerced altruism, as compared with living in autarky. We show that …

analyze how the equilibrium outcome depends on altruism and climate for ex ante identical individuals. We also consider (a …) "coerced altruism," that is, situations where a social norm dictates how output be shared, (b) the effects of insurance markets …, and (c) the role of institutional quality. The evolutionary robustness of altruism is analyzed and we study how this …

rather than positive altruism. In a large class of two-stage games that includes principal-agent and gift-giving games, this …

mixture of true and coerced altruism between family members. We model families as pairs of siblings. Each sibling exerts … actuarially fair formal insurance. We show that coerced family altruism reduces individual efforts in equilibrium. However …, individuals always benefit ex ante from living in families with coerced altruism, as compared with living in autarky. We show that …