We analyze an oligopolistic competition with differentiated products and qualities. The quality of a product is not known to consumers. Each firm can make an imperfect disclosure of its product quality before engaging in price-signaling competition. There are two regimes for separating...

We study an agency model in which an entrepreneur selects a manager from a candidate set. The selected manager's effort improves the project's potential environment, and is a hidden action. The realized project environment is the entrepreneur's private information. A manager's utility has two...

We develop a simple model that provides a new rationale for why a monopolist should bundle its product with a warranty even when all parties are risk neutral. In our model, a risk-neutral monopolist faces two types of risk-neutral consumer slow-risk users that are unlikely to cause product...

Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic incentives under limited commitment. It circumvents ratchet effects and facilitates the revelation of persistent private information through two effects: a play-hardball effect, which...

In a principal-agent framework, we explain different managing styles. In our model, there are two vertical tasks -- an upstream task for improving the project's potential environment, and a downstream task for implementing the project. The downstream task must be done by the worker, but the...