Generalized notions of potential maximizer, monotone potential maximizer (MP-maximizer) and local potential maximizer (LP-maximizer), are studied. It is known that 2x2 coordination games generically have a potential maximizer, while symmetric 4x4 supermodular games may have no MP- or...

This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...

For binary-action supermodular games with a continuum of symmetric players, we show that simple global game information structures can be used to implement an optimal outcome under adversarial equilibrium selection

We characterize global game selections in binary-action supermodular games in terms of sequential obedience: it is shown that an action profile of a binary-action supermodular game is a (possibly noise-dependent) global game selection if and only if it satisfies strict sequential obedience and...

We show that in all (whether generic or nongeneric) binary-action supermodular games, an extreme action profile is robust to incomplete information if and only if it is a monotone potential maximizer. The equivalence does not hold for nonextreme action profiles

We study a strict version of the notion of equilibrium robustness by Kajii and Morris (1997) that allows for a larger class of incomplete information perturbations of a given complete information game, where with high probability, players believe that their payoffs are close to (but may be...

This paper studies equilibrium selection in binary supermodular games based on perfect foresight dynamics. We provide complete characterizations of absorbing and globally accessible equilibria and apply them to two subclasses of games. First, for unanimity games, it is shown that our selection...