reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the …Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes … cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where …

punishment option and compare it to the behavior of individuals in a laboratory experiment. We also consider different team …

information conditions, where cheating is less obvious, punishment is much less effective in enforcing cooperation. Evidently, the … explanatory power of punishment is constrained by the visibility of cheating. …

inclinations. The third pillar are sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a mere … findings, in particular with regard to punishment behaviour. The chapter concludes with remarks on future research. …

inclinations. The third pillar are sanctions meted out to anyone who does not cooperate; ideally punishment can work as a mere … findings, in particular with regard to punishment behaviour. The chapter concludes with remarks on future research. …