Similar Search Results

Regret-free truth-telling in school choice with consent

Chen, Yiqiu; Möller, Markus - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 19 (2024) 2, pp. 635-666

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014576700

Dynamic matching markets and the deferred acceptance mechanism

Kennes, John; Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409407

College choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms : a structural empirical analysis

Carvalho Júnior, José Raimundo de Araújo; Magnac, Thierry - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 10 (2019) 3, pp. 1233-1277

We use rich microeconomic data on performance and choices of students at college entry to analyze interactions between the selection mechanism, eliciting college preferences through exams, and the allocation mechanism. We set up a framework in which success probabilities and student preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012049381

Matching in the large : an experimental study

Chen, Yan; Jiang, Ming; Kesten, Onur; Robin, Stéphane; … - In: Games and economic behavior 110 (2018), pp. 295-317

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012052103

School choice with vouchers

Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz - In: Journal of economic theory 179 (2019), pp. 57-72

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012131458

Flipping a coin: evidence from University applications

Dwenger, Nadja; Kübler, Dorothea; Weizsäcker, Georg - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138437

Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas

Tomoeda, Kentaro - In: Journal of economic theory 176 (2018), pp. 81-117

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980828

Strategic performance of deferred acceptance in dynamic matching problems

Kennes, John; Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - In: American economic journal : a journal of the American … 11 (2019) 2, pp. 55-97

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012012233

Decentralizing centralized matching markets : implications from early offers in university admissions

Grenet, Julien; He, Yinghua; Kübler, Dorothea - 2019

The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise … matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized matching market can often outperform a decentralized one. Using a quasi …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012014369

Decentralizing centralized matching markets : implications from early offers in university admissions

Grenet, Julien; He, Yinghua; Kübler, Dorothea - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012024222