Two insurance companies I 1 ,I 2 with reserves R 1 (t),R 2 (t) compete for customers, such that in a suitable differential game the smaller company I 2 with R 2 (0)<R 1 (0) aims at minimizing R 1 (t)−R 2 (t) by using the premium p 2 as control and the larger I 1 at maximizing by using p 1. Deductibles K 1 ,K 2 are fixed but may be different. If K 1 >K 2 and I 2 is the leader choosing its premium first, conditions for Stackelberg equilibrium are established. For gamma-distributed...</r>

Static and dynamic games are important tools for the analysis of strategic interactions among economic agents and have found many applications in economics. In many games, equilibria can be described as solutions of polynomial equations. In this paper, we describe state-of-the-art techniques for...

This paper presents a numerical method for the characterization of Markov-perfect equilibria of symmetric differential games exhibiting coexisting stable steady-states. The method relying on the calculation of 'local value functions' through collocation in overlapping parts of the state space,...

I provide conditions that guarantee that a Stackelberg game with a setup cost and an integer number of leaders and followers has an equilibrium in pure strategies. The main feature of the game is that when the marginal follower leaves the market the price jumps up, so that a leader's payoff is...