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Economic voting and economic revolutionizing? : the economics of incumbency changes in European democracies and revolutionary events in the Arab World

Möller, Marie - 2011

While people in democracies can vote their government out when they are discontent with its policies, those in dictatorships cannot do so. They can only attempt to expel the dictator via mass protests or revolutions. Based on a general cause-and-effect mechanism, the author analyzes whether such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009382370

Non-consequentialist voting

Shayo, Moses; Harel, Alon - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 81 (2012) 1, pp. 299-313

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009505563

A political agency model of coattail voting

Zudenkova, Galina - In: Journal of public economics 95 (2011) 11/12, pp. 1652-1660

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009425053

Political selection and the concentration of political power

Grunewald, Andreas; Hansen, Emanuel; Pönitzsch, Gert - 2015

concentration of power in the hands of the election winner is optimal if and only if the conflict of interest is small. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011430775

A case for standard theory?

Kuzmics, Christoph; Rodenburger, Daniel - 2015

Using data from an experiment by Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993), designed for a different purpose, we test the "standard theory" that players have preferences only over their own mentary payoffs and that play will be in (evolutionary stable) equilibrium. In the experiment each...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011284229

Voter confirmation bias and electoral accountability

Lockwood, Ben - 2015 - First version: 8 February 2015, This version: 7 June 2015

political agency setting. In the baseline two-period case where only the politician's actions are observable before the election … probability before the election (Maskin and Tirole's "feedback" case). In the three-period case, with two elections, the dynamic … evolution of confirmation bias can lead to more pandering before the first election. Finally, we show that when confirmation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011286492

Local electoral rewards from centralized social programs : are mayors getting the credit?

Rodríguez-Chamussy, Lourdes - 2015

This paper uses variation in the timing of the Mexican antipoverty program's introduction across municipalities to identify its impact on the share of votes for the local incumbent party. Evidence is found that voters reward the mayor's party for the central benefit to their constituencies,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011289331

Moderating Government

De Sinopoli, Francesco; Ferraris, Leo; Iannantuoni, Giovanna - In: Social choice and welfare 45 (2015) 2, pp. 415-440

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377184

Strategic voting under committee approval : an application to the 2011 regional government election in Zurich

Lachat, Romain; Laslier, Jean-François; Van der … - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301880

Are regions important in British elections? : valence politics and local economic contexts at the 2010 General Election

Pattie, Charles J.; Johnston, Ron; Schipper, Mariken; … - In: Regional studies 49 (2015) 9, pp. 1561-1574

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011304216