We study a mechanism design problem where arbitrary restrictions are placed on the sets of first-order beliefs of agents. Calling these restrictions Δ, we use Δ-rationalizability (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003, [5]) as our solution concept, and require that a mechanism virtually implement a...

We consider robust virtual implementation, where robustness is the requirement that implementation succeed in all type spaces consistent with a given payoff type space as well as with a given space of first-order beliefs about the other agents\' payoff types. This last bit, which constitutes our...

We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents' behavior. This inspection game has a unique Bayesian equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...

We consider a median voter model with uncertainty about how theeconomy functions. The distribution of income is exogenously given andthe provision of a public good is ¯nanced through a proportional tax.Voters and politicians do not know the true production function for thepublic good, but by...

We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspectiongame. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legallyor illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’behavior. This inspection game has a unique Bayesian equilibriumin mixed strategies. We...

Consider a society where all agents initially play "fair" and one agent invents a "cheating" strategy such as doping in sports. Which factors determine the success of the new cheating strategy? In order to study this question we consider an evolutionary game with heterogeneous agents who can...

We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents' behavior. This inspection game has a unique (Bayesian) equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...

We study the role of whistle-blowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a valuable prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents' behavior. This control game has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. We...

Price stickiness plays a decisive role in many macroeconomic models, yet why prices are sticky remains a puzzle. We develop a microeconomic model in which two competing firms are free to set prices, but face uncertainty about the state of demand. With some probability, there is a positive demand...