Morris (1996, 1997) introduced preference-based definitions of knowledge and belief in standard state-space structures … defining unawareness and knowledge in terms of preferences over acts in unawareness structures and showing their equivalence to … the epistemic notions of unawareness and knowledge, we try to build a bridge between decision theory and epistemic logic …

We provide a syntactic model of unawareness. By introducing multiple knowledge modalities, one for each sub … knowledge of more aware agents. We show that the model is a complete and sound axiomatization of the set-theoretic model of …

This paper provides a set-theoretic model of knowledge and unawareness. A new property called Awareness Leads to … Knowledge shows that unawareness of theorems not only constrains an agent's knowledge, but also, can impair his reasoning about … what other agents know. For example, in contrast to Li (2009), Heifetz et al. (2006) and the standard model of knowledge …

if common knowledge is assumed (as in the settings of Aumann [1976] and Milgrom and Stokey [1982]), unawareness cannot … generate speculation. This is not true, however, in settings where no common knowledge is assumed, such as speculation in …

Morris (1996, 1997) introduced preference-based definitions of knowledge of belief in standard state-space structures … defining unawareness and knowledge in terms of preferences over acts in unawareness structures and showing their equivalence to … the epistemic notions of unawareness and knowledge, we try to build a bridge between decision theory and epistemic logic …

as knowledge, subject to their own awareness constraints. I characterize the interactive knowledge hierarchies under … knowledge. Aumann's classic characterization of common knowledge does not immediately apply in this environment, even if there … is "common awareness" of the event involved. An alternative characterization of common knowledge is provided …

allow for non-trivial unawareness among several individuals and strong properties of knowledge. We show that a canonical …