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Interactive Unawareness and Speculative Trade

Heifetz, Aviad; Meier, Martin; Schipper, Burkhard C. - University of Bonn, Germany - 2003

, and which satisfies strong properties of knowledge as well as all the desiderata on unawareness proposed this far in the … literature. In an example of speculative trade, we demonstrate how mutual unawareness of fundamentals allows for common knowledge … standard information structures with strong properties of knowledge. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004968454

Thomas S. Schelling: game theory and indirect communication

Estrada, Fernando - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

In their recent work Thomas S. Schelling (2007, 2010), reiterating original arguments about game theory and its applications to social sciences. In particular, game theory helps to explore situations in which agents make decisions interdependent (strategic communication). Schelling's originality...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009372562

Game theory on strategic communication: an approach from Thomas S. Schelling

Estrada, Fernando - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008541485

Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms and Rational Expectations.

Forges, F.; Minelli, E. - Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. - 1996

We introduce a class of communication equilibria, which we call self-fulfilling mechanisms, and show that they provide a game-theoretic foundation to rational expectations equilibria.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618870

Bluff and Reputation.

Sorin, S. - Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. - 1996

This paper describes the historical evolution of the analysis of some aspects of the strategic use of information. The use of mixed strategies aims to create uncertainty on the move to be played or on the private information of the players. In a repeated game framework, strategic behavior when...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005618884

Stepwise Thinking in Strategic Games with Incomplete Information

Nielsen, Carsten S. - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2010

This paper proposes a general incomplete information framework for studying behavior in strategic games with stepwise (viz. `level-k' or `cognitive hierarchy') thinking, which has been found to describe strategic behavior well in experiments involving players' initial responses to games. It is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671248

A cooperative value for Bayesian games

Kalai, Adam Taumann; Kalai, Ehud - 2010

Selfish, strategic players may benefit from cooperation, provided they reach agreement. It is therefore important to construct mechanisms that facilitate such cooperation, especially in the case of asymmetric private information. The two major issues are: (1) singling out a fair and efficient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665710

Behavioral polymorphism in Bayesian games

Fabella, Raul V. - 2016

J. Harsanyi introduced structural polymorphism in game theory, that is, there are many possible agent types such as “low productivity” or high productivity” with corresponding probability but all operating under one behavioral type, strict rationality. In this paper, we introduce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011481671

Refining Nash Equilibrium by Bayesian Iterative Conjectures Approach

Teng, Jimmy - 2012

process of conjectures formation and updating itself is a common knowledge. The BEIC is a refinement of Nash equilibrium and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013100466

Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs

Bhargava, Mohit; Majumdar, Dipjyoti; Sen, Arunava - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 867-885

We study the consequences of positive correlation of beliefs in the design of voting rules in a model with an arbitrary number of voters. We propose a notion of positive correlation, based on the likelihood of agreement of the k best alternatives (for any k) of two orders called TS correlation....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673195