In this paper, we consider a novel game theory model for the competitive influence maximization problem. We model this problem as a simultaneous non-cooperative game with complete information and rational players, where there are at least two players who are supposed to be out of the network and...

In this paper, an efficient implementation of the Tau method is presented for finding the open-loop Nash equilibrium of noncooperative nonzero-sum two-player differential game problems with a finite-time horizon. Regarding this approach, the two-point boundary value problem derived from...

In this paper, we consider a novel game theory model for the competitive influence maximization problem. We model this problem as a simultaneous non-cooperative game with complete information and rational players, where there are at least two players who are supposed to be out of the network and...

In this paper, an efficient implementation of the Tau method is presented for finding the open-loop Nash equilibrium of noncooperative nonzero-sum two-player differential game problems with a finite-time horizon. Regarding this approach, the two-point boundary value problem derived from...

In the present paper we have analyzed an important problem in the field of game theory, which is faced more frequently in the issues of income tax and has not been paid attention by scientific resources. The problem in question is the affect of taxpayer's unintentional error on optimum auditing...