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Spillovers, investment incentives and the property rights theory of the firm

De Meza, David E.; Lockwood, Ben - In: The journal of industrial economics 52 (2004) 2, pp. 229-253

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002109158

A theory of firm scope

Hart, Oliver D. (contributor); Holmström, Bengt (contributor) - 2002 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002111035

Construction contracts (or : "how to get the right building at the right price?")

Chakravarty, Surajeet (contributor); … - 2006

economics ; incomplete contracts ; construction ; agency theory ; industry studies ; outsourcing ; procurement …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003323165

Relational contracts and job design

Schöttner, Anja (contributor) - 2005

This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-verifiable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By...