Many firms define their fiscal quarters as 13-week periods. For these firms each fiscal year contains 52 weeks, which leaves out one/two day(s) a year. To compensate, one extra week is added to every fifth/sixth year; consequently, one quarter therein comprises 14 weeks. We find evidence of...

This study evaluates the extent to which the FASB and IASB convergence projects and the EU-wide adoption of IFRS have impacted the differences between firms' financial results under U.S. GAAP and IFRS. Using 2004 to 2006 reconciliation disclosures of 75 EU cross-listed firms, we find that the...

Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators, regulators, and courts, presumably to encourage favorable policies and/or outcomes. In dollar terms, corporate lobbying expenditures are typically one or even two orders of magnitude larger than spending by Political Action...

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact on pay-performance sensitivity of a commitment by regulatory bodies to monitor the auditing of managers' financial reporting. We approach our investigation first by modeling the effects of an imposed mandatory audit of the auditor. We...

Many firms define their fiscal quarters as 13-week periods so that each fiscal year contains 52 weeks, which leaves out one or two day(s) a year. To compensate, one extra week is added every fifth or sixth year and, consequently, one quarter therein comprises 14 weeks. We find evidence of...

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact on pay-performance sensitivity of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We compare managers' pay-performance sensitivity before and after 2001-2002, a period during which regulatory changes were initiated to increase scrutiny over managerial manipulation...