We show how to combine Bayes nets and game theory to predict the behavior of hybrid systems involving both humans and automated components. We call this novel framework “Semi Network-Form Games,” and illustrate it by predicting aircraft pilot behavior in potential near mid-air collisions. At...

Under its conventional positive interpretation, game theory predicts that the mixed strategy profile of players in a particular noncooperative game will fall within some set determined by the game, e.g., the set of Nash equilibria of that game. Profiles outside of that set are implicitly...

In many cultures a major factor affecting a person's happiness is the difference between their income and that of their neighbors, independent of their own income. This effect is strongest when the income difference is negative (richer neighbor). In addition, across their lifetime, a person's...

The Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) is a powerful alternative to full rationality equilibrium concepts. Under the QRE all joint strategies have non-zero probability, so non-credible threats cannot arise. However in mixed scenarios, where some players use quantal response and some use best...

Conventionally, game theory predicts that the joint mixed strategy of players in a noncooperative game will satisfy some equilibrium concept. Relative probabilities of the joint strategies satisfying the concept are unspecified, and all strategies not satisfying it are assigned probability zero....

We introduce a framework that explains non-rationality in non-repeated games. In our framework a player i adopts a binding "persona" - a temporary utility function --- that they honestly signal before play. By adopting a "non-rational" persona, i may cause changes in their opponents' behavior...

In experimental tests of human behavior in unstructured bargaining games, typically many joint utility outcomes are found to occur, not just one. This suggests we predict the outcome of such a game as a probability distribution. This is in contrast to what is conventionally done (e.g, in the...

We adapt the method used by Jaynes to derive the equilibria of statistical physics to instead derive equilibria of bounded rational game theory. We analyze the dependence of these equilibria on the parameters of the underlying game, focusing on hysteresis effects. In particular, we show that by...