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Utilitarian collective choice and voting

Hillinger, Claude - 2004

In his seminal Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow stated that his theory applies to voting. Many voting … theorists have been convinced that, on account of Arrow's theorem, all voting methods must be seriously flawed. Arrow's theory … theory leaves k to be determined on pragmatic grounds. A (1,0) scale gives approval voting. I prefer the scale (1,0,-1) and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440461

The shape of luck and competition in winner-take-all tournaments

Ryvkin, Dmitry; Drugov, Mikhail - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 4, pp. 1587-1626

In winner-take-all tournaments, agents' performance is determined jointly by effort and luck, and the top performer is rewarded. We study the impact of the ''shape of luck'' -- the details of the distribution of performance shocks -- on incentives in such settings. We are concerned with the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415494

Do overconfident workers cooperate less? : the relationship between overconfidence and cooperation in team production

Mertins, Vanessa; Hoffeld, Wolfgang - 2013

voluntary cooperation in team production. Our experimental data suggest an indirect and gender-specific link: Overconfident men …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225443

Competing on the holodeck : the effect of virtual peers and heterogeneity in dynamic tournaments

Graff, Jan Frederik; Grund, Christian; Harbring, Christine - 2018

We propose experiments in virtual reality (VR) as a new approach to examining behavior in an economic context, e.g., heterogeneity in dynamic tournaments. We simulate a realistic working situation in a highly immersive environment. Implementing a tournament in VR, we are able to mitigate the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946765

Tournament Incentives and Reserve Management

Nart, Ahmet - 2020

This paper examines the relation between tournament incentives and reserve management. We find a positive relation between internal tournament incentives and reserve errors, implying that a larger pay gap as a tournament prize induces vice presidents (VPs) to overestimate loss reserves. In other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012845912

Sequential Tournaments

Jost, Peter J. - 2002

I study the design of sequential tournaments in which one agent makes his effort choice after observing the other agent's decision. In case the two agents are homogeneous and both risk-neutral, sequential tournaments are identical to simultaneous tournaments w.r. to prizes and effort...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014117142

Should law keep pace with society? : relative update rates determine the co-evolution of institutional punishment and citizen contributions to public goods

Roithmayr, Daria; Isakov, Alexander; Rand, David - In: Games 6 (2015) 2, pp. 124-149

Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional … maximize compliance? We investigate this question by modeling the co-evolution of law and cooperation in a public goods game …' updating of their contribution strategy and observe the effect on Citizen cooperation. We find that when States have unlimited …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316651

Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships : an experiment

Crosetto, Paolo; Gaudeul, Alexia; Riener, Gerhard - 2014

We explore in an experiment what leads to the breakdown of partnerships. Subjects are assigned a partner and participate in a repeated public good game with stochastic outcomes. They can choose each period between staying in the public project or working on their own. There is excessive exit as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340746

Conditional cooperation and voluntary contributions to public goods

Keser, Claudia; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2000

We compare a partners condition where the same small group of subjects plays arepeated public good game to astrangers condition where subjects play this game in changing group formations.Subjects in the partners conditioncontribute from the first period on significantly more to the public good...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011303327

The influence of empirical and normative expectations on cooperation

Kölle, Felix; Quercia, Simone - 2021 - This version: June 2021

others' contributions, we find a strong norm of conditional cooperation whereby people find it socially appropriate to match …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012548861