The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk under optimal incentive regulation …. Regulatory risk is captured by uncertainty about the policy variables in the regulator's objective function: weights attached to … profits and costs of public funds. Results are as follows: 1) The regulator's reaction to regulatory risk depends on the …

The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk. Regulatory risk is captured by … funds. Results are as follows: 1) The regulator's reaction to regulatory risk depends on the curvature of aggregate demand …. 2) It yields a positive information rent effect exactly when demand is convex. 3) Firms benefit from regulatory risk …

We develop a novel argument why better public information can help countries to insure against idiosyncratic risk … and engage in risk-sharing contracts with limited enforceability. Better public information has two opposite effects …. First, it has a detrimental effect on risk sharing by limiting risk-sharing possibilities as emphasized by Hirshleifer (1971 …