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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011788597
Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from classical moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties. I show that the (implicit) assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014458796
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014289610
Most insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast to the previous literature on costly state verification, which has shown that it is optimal to commit to an auditing strategy, as the credible announcement of thoroughly auditing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003971534
Most insurance companies publish few data on the occurrence and detection of insurance fraud. This stands in contrast to the previous literature on costly state verification, which has shown that it is optimal to commit to an auditing strategy, as the credible announcement of thoroughly auditing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009378820
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358089
We analyze a competitive labor market in which workers signal their productivities through education à la Spence (1973), and firms have the option of auditing to learn workers’ productivities. Audits are costly and non–contractible. We characterize the trade–offs between signaling by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648090
Promises are prevalent in many economic environments. They offer the opportunity to honor future obligations when promise keeping is observable. This paper studies the value of transparency and asks whether promises still work if such transparency is missing. We focus on the context of campaign...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012231501
In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011878774
In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011888619