We examine whether a large shareholder can alleviate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders through the credible threat of exit on the basis of private information. In our model, the threat of exit often reduces agency costs, but additional private information need not enhance...

Explores the financial contracts that can be entered into by the entrepreneur and the inside investor that permit optimal continuation and investment decisions. The inside investor is assumed to be a venture capitalist. The unique contract under examination is termed the fixed-fraction contract....

In this paper we analyze a model of voluntary disclosure by firms in financial markets. We focus on externalities that arise when firm values are correlated and the disclosures made by one firm affect the valuation of other firms. In our model, firms can choose the precision of their disclosure,...

We examine whether a large shareholder can alleviate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders through the credible threat of exit on the basis of private information. In our model, the threat of exit often reduces agency costs, but additional private information need not enhance...

This paper is motivated by the vast quantity of public broadcasting that occurs on the internet, e.g., customer reviews of products on various sites. We analyze a model of information transmission in which a sender attempts to communicate information to a population of receivers using a finite...

We analyze a model where an altruistic, but possibly overconfident sender broadcasts one of a finite set of messages to rational receivers. If broadcasting is costless and the sender is rational, there is an informationally efficient equilibrium, but multiple equilibria may arise, and asymmetric...

While it is recognized that the high degree of leverage used by financial institutions creates systemic risks and other negative externalities, many argue that equity financing is “expensive,” and that increased capital requirements will increase the cost of credit. Public subsidies of debt...

We analyze a model where an altruistic sender, who may or may not be informed, broadcasts one of a finite set of messages to rational receivers. If broadcasting is costless and the sender is rational, there is an informationally efficient equilibrium, but this equilibrium is not necessarily...

We examine whether a large shareholder can alleviate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders through the credible threat of exit on the basis of private information. In our model the threat of exit often reduces agency costs, but additional private information need not enhance...

Heterosedasticity in returns may be explainable by trading volume. We use different volume variables, including surprise volume - i.e. unexpected above-avergae trading activity - which is derived from uncorrelated volume innovations. Assuming eakly exogenous volume, we extend the Lamoureux and...