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Time-varying fairness concerns, delay, and disagreement in bargaining

Karagözoğlu, Emin; Keskin, Kerim - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 147 (2018), pp. 115-128

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011985864

Reciprocal climate negotiators

Nyborg, Karine - In: Journal of environmental economics and management : … 92 (2018), pp. 707-725

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012015706

Symmetry in bargaining and efficient contracts under asymmetric information

Sen, Arijit - In: Studies in microeconomics 5 (2017) 2, pp. 132-142

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012023835

Delegation with incomplete and renegotiable contracts

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2008 - This version: April 2008

It is well known that delegating the play of a game to an agent via incentive contracts may serve as a commitment device and hence provide a strategic advantage. Previous literature has shown that any Nash equilibrium outcome of an extensive-form principals-only game can be supported as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001777

Should the more efficient firm expand? : a bargaining perspective

Trudeau, Christian; Wang, Zheng - In: Economics letters 180 (2019), pp. 25-27

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012121745

Bargaining delay under partial breakdowns and externalities

Kawamori, Tomohiko; Miyakawa, Toshiji - In: Economics letters 183 (2019), pp. 1-5

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012122548

Drivers of durable peace : the role of justive in negotiating civil war termination

Wagner, Lynn; Druckman, Daniel - In: Group decision and negotiation 26 (2017) 1, pp. 45-67

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011646567

The effect of stake size in experimental bargaining and distribution games : a survey

Karagözoğlu, Emin; Urhan, Ümit Barış - In: Group decision and negotiation 26 (2017) 2, pp. 284-325

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011646894

Ultimatum game bargaining in a partially directed search market

Kloosterman, Andrew; Paul, Stephen - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 154 (2018), pp. 60-74

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011986793

Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification

Silva, Francisco - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 3, pp. 971-1014

I consider the interaction between an agent and a principal who is unable to commit not to renegotiate. The agent's type only affects the principal's utility. The principal has access to a public signal, correlated with the agent's type, which can be used to (imperfectly) verify the agent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012104604