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Department: Economics.
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We analyze delegation of a set of decisions over time by an informed principal to a potentially biased agent. Each period the principal observes a state of the world and sends a 'cheap-talk' message to the agent, who is privately informed about her bias. We focus on principal-optimal equilibria...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011696314
We analyze a repeated cheap-talk game in which the receiver is privately informed about the conflict of interest between herself and the sender and either the sender or the receiver controls the stakes involved in their relationship. We focus on payoff-dominant equilibria that satisfy a...
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perfectly competitive equilibria.
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This paper shows that all perfect Bayesian equilibria of a dynamic matching game with two-sided incomplete information of independent private values variety converge to competitive equilibria. Buyers purchase a bundle of heterogeneous, indivisible goods and sellers own one unit of an indivisible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266300
This paper considers a frictional market where buyers and sellers, with unit demand and supply, search for trading opportunities. The analysis focuses on explicit search frictions, allows for two-sided incomplete information, and puts no restriction on agent heterogeneity. In this context, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273653