The first price auction is the auction procedure awarding the item to the highest bidder at the price equal to his bid. Much attention has been devoted to the two bidder case or to the symmetric case where the bidders' valuations are identically and independently distributed. We consider the...

Despite the complexity of the first price auction in the general asymmetric case, analytical results have started to emerge in the literature. Authors have searched to gain insights by computing numerical estimates of the equilibria for some particular probability distributions of the...

Within the Independent Private Value or IPV Model, the estimation of the valuation distributions from the bids submitted at first price auctions is receiving growing attention (see the surveys by Laffont 1997 and Perrigne and Vuong 1999). Such a structural estimation is important in order, for...

There exists an explicit formula for the equilibrium strategies of the first price auction only in the symmetric case where the bidders’ valuations are distributed identically. The first price auction is considerably more difficult to investigate in the general case where the valuations may be...

If there is asymmetry among the bidders taking part in a first price auction, the equilibrium is not expost efficient. We consider a simple model of first price auction among two bidders where resale always occurs in case of inefficiency. We obtain mathematical formulas for the equilibrium...

We prove that, around the symmetric case, where the values are identically distributed, the equilibrium of the first price auction is jointly differentiable with respect to general bidder-specific parameters of the value distributions. We show that the revenue equivalence between the first-price...

We study the first price auction game with an arbitrary number of bidders when the bidders' valuations are independent from each other. In technical words, we work within the "independent private value model". We show that if the supports of the valuation probability distributions have the same...