We study the first price auction game with an arbitrary number of bidders when the bidders' valuations are independent from each other. In technical words, we work within the "independent private value model." We show that if the supports of the valuation probability distributions have the same...

We study the first price auction game with an arbitrary number of bidders when the bidders' valuations are independent from each other. In technical words, we work within the "independent private value model". We show that if the supports of the valuation probability distributions have the same...

Although there exists a pure separating equilibrium of the two-bidder first-price auction with resale when the bids are kept secret, the ratchet effect prevents the existence of such an equilibrium if the bidders are heterogeneous and the bids are fully disclosed. Nevertheless, we construct a...

When the price setter in post-auction resale is chosen according to exogenous probabilities, Hafalir and Krishna (2008) [2] showed that the first-price auction brings more expected revenues than the second-price auction with truth-bidding bidders. We complete their revenue ranking by proving...

When the demand functions depend on a one-dimensional private parameter, the two-unit pay-your-bid auction with two homogeneous bidders is equivalent to the one-unit first price auction with two heterogeneous bidders. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the pay-your-bid auction,...

The first price auction is the auction procedure awarding the item to the highest bidder at the price equal to his bid. Much attention has been devoted to the two bidder case or to the symmetric case where the bidders' valuations are identically and independently distributed. We consider the...