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Misaligning Incentives in Teams : Unique Implementation with Optimal Monitoring
Cusumano, Carlo; Gan, Tan; Pieroth, Ferdinand - 2023
sophisticated ways to misalign workers’ incentives can be used to extract the full surplus from a team of workers growing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014345642
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Pay equality among heterogeneous agents
Hoffman, Ryan; Kambhampati, Ashwin; Kaplan, Scott - In: Economics letters 229 (2023), pp. 1-4
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014455251
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Fairness concerns in heterogeneous teams : utility, reward, and income
Chen, Lin; Désir, Antoine; Roels, Guillaume - 2023 - Revised version of 2023/34/TOM
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014442029
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Why do managers under-delegate? : a co-productive principal-agent model
Roels, Guillaume; Smirnov, Vladimir; Tsetlin, Ilia; … - 2023 - Revised version of 2021/36/TOM/DSC
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014442033
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Effort and risk-taking in tournaments with superstars : evidence for teams
Lackner, Mario - In: Applied economics 55 (2023) 57, pp. 6776-6792
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014382769
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Profit sharing and incentives
Ozdenoren, Emre; Rubanov, Oleg - In: International journal of industrial organization 83 (2022), pp. 1-25
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013411050
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Team diversity and incentives
Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 69 (2023) 4, pp. 2497-2516
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014305421
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Relative pay for non-relative performance : keeping up with the Joneses with optimal contracts
DeMarzo, Peter M.; Kaniel, Ron - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011550882
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Relative Pay for Non-Relative Performance : Keeping Up with the Joneses with Optimal Contracts
DeMarzo, Peter M. - 2017
We consider a multi-agent contracting setting when agents have “keeping up with the Joneses” (KUJ) preferences. Because productivity is affected by common shocks, it is optimal to base pay on performance relative to a benchmark. But when agents and care about how their pay compares to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012969665
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Risk taking in competition : evidence from match play golf tournaments
Ozbeklik, Serkan; Smith, Janet Kiholm - In: The journal of corporate finance : contracting, … 44 (2017), pp. 506-523
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753045