The author uses monthly, individual-level data collected from two units within a large U.S. financial corporation to estimate employees' response to the introduction of a group incentive plan. The findings indicate that the incentive plan caused performance to converge to a standard: the...

This paper studies how moral feelings (hostility or altruism) modify incentive contractsin the Holmström and Milgrom (1990) multi-agent moral hazard model. One agentfeels altruism or hostility towards the other. His objective function is assumed to be aweighted sum of the two certain...

In a real effort lab experiment, I experimentally examine the effects of framing monetary incentives on teams and individuals. I use two frames, a positive in which I pay workers a bonus when they reach a certain productivity threshold and an equivalent negative frame in which I reduce their...

We study a relational contracting model with two agents where each agent faces multiple tasks: effort toward the agent's own project and helping effort toward another agent's project. We first propose the two-step approach, which is useful for characterizing the equilibrium of relational...