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Strategic delegation improves cartel stability
Han, Martijn A. - 2012
cartel stability. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318791
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Tacit collusion : the neglected experimental evidence
Engel, Christoph - 2015
Both in the US and in Europe, antitrust authorities prohibit merger not only if the merged entity, in and of itself, is no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure has changed such that "tacit collusion" or "coordinated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010483415
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Tacit Collusion : The Neglected Experimental Evidence
Engel, Christoph - 2007
Both in the US and in Europe, antitrust authorities prohibit merger not only if the merged entity, in and of itself, is no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure has changed such that tacit collusion becomes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012728899
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Tacit Collusion – The Neglected Experimental Evidence
Engel, Christoph - 2015
Both in the US and in Europe, antitrust authorities prohibit merger not only if the merged entity, in and of itself, is no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure has changed such that "tacit collusion" or "coordinated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027879
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Short-term managerial contracts and cartels
Han, Martijn A. - 2012
This paper shows how a series of commonly observed short-term CEO employment contracts can improve cartel stability … cartel stability. Studying the impact of fixed versus variable salary components, I find that fixed components can facilitate … collusion with a short-term contract, while not affecting cartel stability with a long-term contract. Moreover, an extension of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009628399
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Strategic Delegation Improves Cartel Stability
Han, Martijn A. - 2011
profits. However, with infinitely repeated interaction, strategic delegation allows for an improvement in cartel stability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013132037
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Tacit Collusion with Price-Matching Punishments
Lu, Yuanzhu - 2009
provides a game theoretic interpretation of the old kinked demand curve theory which unlike earlier attempts does not depart …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013155040
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Tacit collusion of conglomerate firms through price signaling under multimarket contact
Horstmann, Niklas - 2016
We suggest a price signaling strategy that offers a microfoundation for the process leading to tacit collusion under multimarket contact, even in cases where previous theoretical explanations fail. It rests on the assumptions that firms can communicate collusive intentions solely through their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006153
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Tacit Collusion with Price Matching Punishments
Lu, Yuanzhu; Wright, Julian - 2005
We re-examine tacit collusion under a simple punishment rule in which firms match any lower price by their rivals, but otherwise leave their prices unchanged. We provide conditions under which this simple rule sustains collusion and is credible. Provided competition is imperfect, collusion can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014061873
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Optimal Collusion with Private Information
Bagwell, Kyle; Athey, Susan - 2013
We analyze collusion in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game, where prices are publicly observed and each firm receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. Productive efficiency is possible only if high-cost firms relinquish market share. In the most profitable collusive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034931