We provide a model able to compute a threshold level for the public debt/GDP ratio, such that a country can be rescued by an official lender (e.g. ESM or IMF). The critical level is defined as the maximum level of debt/GDP, such that it is still possible to put the debt/GDP ratio on a...

Official lenders provide financial assistance to countries that face sovereign debt crisis. The availability of financial assistance has counteracting effects on the default incentives of governments. On the one hand, financial assistance can help to avoid defaults by bridging times of...

This paper studies debt fragility and the sharing of the resulting strategic uncertainty through ex post bailouts. Default arises in equilibrium because of both fundamental shocks and beliefs. The probability of default depends on borrowing rates and, in equilibrium, on the beliefs of lenders...

This paper explores the welfare effects of the seniority requirement of the international lender of the last resort (ILLR). An ILLR with seniority decreases the interest burden of the country because ILLR accepts a lower interest rate due to the higher chance of getting repaid. On the other...