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Reverse Revolving Doors : The Influence of Interest Groups on Legislative Voting

Alquezar-Yus, Miguel; Amer-Mestre, Josep - 2021

) influence the voting behavior of their colleague legislators. Using the alphabetic allocation of seats in the European … achieving a 44% reduction in voting abstention. Lobbyist legislators substantially increase the likelihood of their connections …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242432

Special interest groups versus voters and the political economics of attention

Balles, Patrick; Matter, Ulrich; Stutzer, Alois - 2018

Asymmetric information between voters and legislative representatives poses a major challenge to the functioning of representative democracy. We examine whether representatives are more likely to serve long-term campaign donors instead of constituents during times of low media attention to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011949175

Special interest groups versus voters and the political economics of attention

Balles, Patrick; Matter, Ulrich; Stutzer, Alois - 2020

We examine whether representatives are more likely to serve long-term campaign donors instead of constituents during times of low media attention to politics. Based on 425 roll calls between 2005 and 2014 in the US House of Representatives, we show that representatives are more likely to vote...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012211217

Special interest groups versus voters and the political economics of attention

Balles, Patrick; Matter, Ulrich; Stutzer, Alois - 2024

We investigate whether US House representatives favour special interest groups over constituents in periods of low media attention to politics. Analysing 666 roll calls from 2005 to 2018, we show that representatives are more likely to vote against their constituency's preferred position the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014512422

Committees and Special Interests

Felgenhauer, Mike; Gruner, H. P. - 2021

committees benefits from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters … increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This … is not the case in a closed committee where costs and benefits of insincere voting only arise when a voter is pivotal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319559

Biased forecasts and voting : the Brexit referendum case

Bizzotto, Jacopo; Cipullo, Davide; Reslow, André - 2024 - This version: July 1, 2024

This paper explores whether professional macroeconomic forecasters manipulate their forecasts to influence voting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014583811

Lobbying of firms by voters

Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert A. J.; Glazer, Amihai - 2009

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011378822

Who is the ultimate boss of legislators : voters, special interest groups or parties?

Stadelmann, David; Torrens, Gustavo - 2020

Politicians have multiple principals. We investigate the weights that politicians put on the revealed preferences of their constituents, special interest groups and party when deciding on legislative proposals. Preferences of constituents, special interest groups and parties are directly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012425941

Biased forecasts to affect voting decisions? : the Brexit case

Cipullo, Davide; Reslow, André - 2019

influence voting outcomes. We develop a probabilistic voting model in which voters do not have complete information about the … forecasters with economic interest (stakes) and influence to publish biased forecasts prior to a referendum. We test our theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011990008

Vote buying in the US Congress

Matter, Ulrich; Roberti, Paolo; Slotwinski, Michaela - 2019

We assess the influence of moneyed interests on legislative decisions. Our theory predicts that the vote outcome … groups are involved in vote buying. Testing the theoretical predictions based on two decades of roll-call voting in the U …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126192