This Monitoring report on the implementation of FP6 during the year 2006 represents a unique endeavour, as it is … bridging from the traditional approach to monitoring in FP6 (and previous Framework Programmes) to the new requirements for … monitoring in FP7. …

Effective monitoring requires proper incentives and detection skill. Detection skills depend on the extent of … specialization in monitoring and on the number of agents to be supervised. This paper demonstrates that hierarchy and monitoring of … monitors can provide the necessary incentives for the monitoring agents, which induces them to make use of their detection …

This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the … is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving …

Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate the agent to raise his effort level … realtask laboratory experiment, our results show that principals are not trustful enough to refrain from monitoring the agents …, and most of the agents react to the disciplining effect of monitoring. However we find also some evidence that intrinsic …

Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of … mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which … in which the effectiveness of mutual monitoring depends not on these factors, but rather on strong reciprocity: the …

they will tend to rely more on monitoring, ceteris paribus. Alternatively put, when the probability of job separation is … monitoring and performance pay may be complementary. However, consonant with the disparate results from the wider literature …

performance appraisal systems, monitoring by supervisors, autonomy to organize the work) and individuals' inclination to trust … strict working time regulations, monitoring and lack of autonomy - all indicators for control at the workplace - are …

gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project … choice. Optimality would require a large ownership stake for monitoring but a small stake for not interfering with managerial …. The large shareholder retains full ownership of the firm but monitoring, and the resulting firing policy, are distorted …