We add some elements of prospect theory to an analytically tractable version of Lucas's “islands” model and show that the inclusion of reference dependence, declining sensitivity and loss aversion into the agents’ utility function leads to four main results. First, the presence of...

This paper conducts a systematic comparison of behavioral economics’s challenges to the standard accounts of economic behaviors within three dimensions: under risk, over time and regarding other people. A new perspective on two underlying methodological issues, i.e., interdisciplinarity and...

This paper shows that prospect theory, extended to account for differences across individuals in their patience and their valuation of the vaccination as a common good can explain why more than 40% of the population has intent to reject the Covid-19 vaccination, as well as the differences in...

Financial constraints or economic needs, career development, psychological satisfaction as well as demographic and situational factors cause workers to seek more than one job while enjoying leisure time. In this paper we examine how a worker with prospect theory type of preferences allocates her...

We investigate whether depleting people's cognitive resources (or "willpower") affects the degree to which they are susceptible to framing effects. Recent research in social psychology and economics has suggested that willpower is a resource that can be temporarily depleted and that a depleted...

Human behavior is not always consistent with standard rational choice predictions. The much-investigated variety of apparent deviations from rational choice predictions provides a promising arena for the merger of economics and biology. Although little is known about the extent to which other...

We measure individual-level loss aversion using three incentivized, representative surveys of the U.S. population (combined N = 3,000). We find that around 50% of the U.S. population is loss tolerant, with many participants accepting negative-expected-value gambles. This is counter to earlier...

We consider individual decision-making where every alternative appears with a frame (a la Salant and Rubinstein (2008)), for instance a chocolate in a gift-box. The decision maker is subject to inattention that leads to random choice. A novelty in our work is that we explicitly model framing...

An axiomatization of expected utility under uncertainty is extended in several steps to characterize more complicated decision models. Central to each step is a bijective mapping that, applied to the set of prospects, changes the framing of the decision problem. Static models of subjective...