In this paper, I develop a two-stage game of pollution abatement technology adoption in a Cournot oligopoly to investigate a firm's decision to adopt pollution abatement technology. In particular, I study the adoption incentives and welfare implications of popular environmental policies, namely...

For much of the industrialized world, pollution from manufacturing has been falling despite increased output. In this paper, we provide the first estimates of the extent to which environmental regulations have contributed to this “clean-up” of manufacturing by causing: (i) the adoption of...

Axbard and Deng (2024) exploit the rollout of new pollution monitors in China in 2015 in 177 medium-size cities to study the effect of air-quality monitors on enforcement actions by local governments and air quality. In their main difference-in-difference analysis, they identify the change in...

We study the effects of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) on employment and profits as well as on the investment decisions of Dutch manufacturing firms. Motivated both by sizable differences between firms that are regulated in different phases and by the gradual increase in regulatory...

This paper uses data from the U.S. electric power industry to explore the strategic responses of regulated firms to government enforcement. We focus on the enforcement of New Source Review, a provision of the Clean Air Act that imposes stringent emissions limitations on substantially modified...

It remains an open question whether the impact of environmental regulations differs by the size of the business. Such differences might be expected because of statutory, enforcement, and/or compliance asymmetries. Here, we consider the net effect of these three asymmetries, by estimating the...

We investigate the impact of an environmental award in a Bertrand duopoly with green consumers considering a three-stage game. First, the regulator designs the environmental contest. Second, firms choose their green investments, and the winner of the contest is awarded. Third, firms compete in...

We investigate the impact of an environmental award in a Bertrand duopoly with green consumers considering a three-stage game. First, the regulator designs the environmental contest. Second, firms choose their green investments, and the winner of the contest is awarded. Third, firms compete in...

We investigate the impact of an environmental award in a Bertrand duopoly with green consumers considering a three-stage game. First, the regulator designs the environmental contest. Second, firms choose their green investments, and the winner of the contest is awarded. Third, firms compete in...

We investigate the impact of an environmental award in a Bertrand duopoly with green consumers considering a three-stage game. First, the regulator designs the environmental contest. Second, firms choose their green investments, and the winner of the contest is awarded. Third, firms compete in...