Narrow search
Showing 61 - 70 of 17,926
Cover Image
The Third Generation (Umts) Spectrum Auction in Germany
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2021
competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320762
Cover Image
The Swiss Umts Spectrum Auction Flop : Bad Luck or Bad Design?
Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2021
introduced in England and adopted in Switzerland and elsewhere is a cause of the disappointing performance of many UMTS auctions … revenue or more competition. The paper closes with several proposals on how one should conduct future spectrum auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320852
Cover Image
Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
Meisner, Vincent; Jarman, Felix - In: Essays in microeconomic theory, (pp. 5-57). 2016
We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. A project's cost is private information and its value for the designer may vary. In this allocation problem, the selection of projects - both which and how many - is endogenously...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011633851
Cover Image
Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
Jarman, Felix; Meisner, Vincent - 2017
We consider a budget-constrained mechanism designer who selects an optimal set of projects to maximize her utility. Projects may differ in their value for the designer, and their cost is private information. In this allocation problem, the quantity of procured projects is endogenously determined...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697176
Cover Image
The third generation (UMTS) spectrum auction in Germany
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 2001
competitive market structure than other UMTS auctions in Europe. The present paper explains the design of that auction, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956370
Cover Image
Implementing efficient market structure
Grimm, Veronika; Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - Sonderforschungsbereich 373, Quantifikation und … - 2000
This article studies the design of optimal mechanisms to regulate entry in natural oligopoly markets, assuming the regulator is unable to control the behavior of firms once they are in the market. We adapt the Clarke-Groves mechanism, characterize the optimal mechanism that maximizes the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010956424
Cover Image
Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding is Costly
Hu, Luke - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556728
Cover Image
Security bid auctions for agency contracts
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of … outperform all other auctions, although it cannot extract the entire surplus implement efficient effort. Hence, profit sharing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556730
Cover Image
Why Every Economist Should Learn some Auction Theory
Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000
None available
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604844
Cover Image
A dynamic auction for multi-object procurement under a hard budget constraint
Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - In: Research Policy 43 (2014) 1, pp. 179-189
’ financial constraints are private information. The literature has recommended the use of auctions in order to reduce information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010729634