"Using a simple empirical strategy, we decode the information in insider trades. Exploiting the fact that insiders trade for a variety of reasons, we show that there is predictable, identifiable "routine" insider trading that is not informative for the future of firms. Stripping away these...

Using a simple empirical strategy, we decode the information in insider trades. Exploiting the fact that insiders trade for a variety of reasons, we show that there is predictable, identifiable "routine" insider trading that is not informative for the future of firms. Stripping away these...

Using a simple empirical strategy, we decode the information in insider trades. Exploiting the fact that insiders trade for a variety of reasons, we show that there is predictable, identifiable "routine" insider trading that is not informative for the future of firms. Stripping away these...

The disclosure of inside information is a core component of EU capital market regulation. It underpins the market abuse regime, providing information to investors, and robbing it of its “inside” quality. Different regimes tackle the issue of inside information disclosure in distinct ways....

We study information acquisition in a strategic setting where traders can produce either fundamental information or non-fundamental information. Fundamental information is related to the traded asset value. Non-fundamental information is related to noise trading (transitory random demand)....

I model the investors' costly information acquisition behaviours with strategic communication of asymmetric information in financial markets. I extend the dynamic insider trading model based on Kyle(Econometrica 53 (1985) 1315) to allow for costly, unobservable information acquisition, assuming...