We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long … renegotiated outcome sticky and materially inefficient. The theory has important implications for the optimal design of long …

We propose a theory of inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long … renegotiated outcome sticky and materially inefficient. The theory has important implications for the optimal design of long …

We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long … renegotiated outcome sticky and materially inefficient. The theory has important implications for the optimal design of long …

We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long … renegotiated outcome sticky and materially inefficient. The theory has important implications for the optimal design of long …

We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long … renegotiated outcome sticky and materially inefficient. The theory has important implications for the optimal design of long …

We propose a theory of ex post inefficient renegotiation that is based on loss aversion. When two parties write a long … renegotiated outcome sticky and materially inefficient. The theory has important implications for the optimal design of long …

(2015), even though loss aversion makes renegotiation sometimes inefficient. During renegotiation, the outcome induced by … "bad" states. This alters the threat point in renegotiation, making it easier to renegotiate and thus improves the …

renegotiation. If the buyer expects renegotiation always to take place, the parties are always able to implement the materially … efficient good ex post. It can be optimal for the buyer, however, to expect that renegotiation does not take place. In this case …, a good of too high quality or too low quality is traded ex post. Based on the buyer's expectation management, our theory …

renegotiation. If the buyer expects renegotiation always to take place, the parties are always able to implement the materially … efficient good ex post. It can be optimal for the buyer, however, to expect that renegotiation does not take place. In this case …, a good of too high quality or too low quality is traded ex post. Based on the buyer's expectation management, our theory …

(2015), even though loss aversion makes renegotiation sometimes inefficient. During renegotiation, the outcome induced by … is not in a "bad" state. This alters the threat-point in renegotiation, making it easier to renegotiate and thus improves …