We estimate the effect of Internet on the volume of used car transactions. From 1997 to 2007, Internet use tripled in California, causing an increase in volume-of-trade of 7.2 %. This implies a substantial welfare gain via improved allocative efficiency.

This paper specifies and estimates a structural dynamic model of consumer demand for newand used durable goods. Its primary contribution is to provide an explicit estimationprocedure for transaction costs, which are crucial to capturing the dynamic nature ofconsumer decisions. In particular,...

The focus of the present work is to study the impact of the second-hand market the collusivebehavior. I analyze firms' preferences for having an active second-hand market and whetherpolicies (i.e. leasing policy, buy-back policy and warranty policy) that affect the functioningof the second-hand...

We explain why a durable-goods monopolist would like to create a shortage during the launch phase of a new product. We argue that this incentive arises from the presence of a second-hand market and uncertainty about consumers׳ willingness to pay for the good. Consumers are heterogeneous and...

A monopolist launches a new product to distinct markets. The monopolist does not know the quality of the product while consumers in each market receive some private information about the quality. We study how the monopolist may in°uence consumer learning by manipulating the launching sequence...

type="main" <p>We show FC-MNL is flexible in the sense of Diewert ([Diewert, E., 1974]), thus its parameters can be chosen to match a well-defined class of possible own- and cross-price elasticities of demand. In contrast to models such as Probit and Random Coefficient-MNL models, FC-MNL does not...</p>

I show that when oligopolistic firms manufacture semidurable goods, second-hand\par markets can play a key role in supporting collusive behavior. This in spite of the fact\par that a monopolist manufacturer has an incentive to eliminate second-hand markets \endash\par a point made by a number of...

We explain why a durable-goods monopolist would like to create a shortage during the launch phase of a new product. We argue that this incentive arises from the presence of a second-hand market and uncertainty about consumers?willingness to pay for the good. Consumers are heterogeneous in their...