Post regulatory enactments, Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act, 2002 and the Narayana Murthy Committee's report, responsibilities of the board have undergone a major change. Consequently, different aspects of board structure, comprising board size, board independence and CEO duality, have become...

This study presents an integrated investigation into the factors affecting executive ownership, the market value of the finn, and executive compensation by explicitly incorporating the simultaneity of the process determining these variables into the empirical estimation, Overall, the results of...

Are the professional networks of corporate directors valuable? More connected directors may have better information and more influence, which can increase firm value. However, these directors may also be busy or spread value-decreasing practices. To separate the effect of director networks on...

We find that the presence of independent directors who are blockholders (IDBs) in firms promotes better CEO contracting and monitoring, and higher firm valuation. Using a panel of about 11,500 firm-years with a unique, hand-collected dataset on IDB-identity and a novel instrument, we find that...

The problem that plagues Indian family-controlled firms is expropriation of minority shareholders by majority shareholders. Gender quota legislation that mandates appointment of at least one female director without specifying the director type as “independent” exacerbates this...

While US companies mainly list their board of directors alphabetically, this is not the case for Chinese companies, most of which list their independent directors last. We interpret the listing order of Chinese directors as board hierarchy, reflecting power allocation within the board. Based on...

There remain open questions regarding whether board of director ethnic and gender diversity increases or decreases firm value. Additionally, prior research has yet to examine the value effects of a diverse board in the presence of a gender/ethnic minority CEO. Using the KLD social ratings...

This paper shows that exogenous director distraction affects board monitoring intensity and leads to a higher level of inactivity by management. We construct a firm-level director "distraction'' measure by exploiting shocks to unrelated industries in which directors have additional...