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In the current FIFA penalty shootout mechanism, a coin toss decides which team will kick first. Empirical evidence suggests that the team taking the first kick has a higher probability to win a shootout. We design sequentially fair shootout mechanisms such that in all symmetric Markov-perfect...
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Suppes-Sen Dominance is a commonly accepted criterion of impartiality in distributive justice. Mariotti (1999) characterized the Nash bargaining solution using Nash (1950).s Scale Invariance (SI) axiom and an axiom named Suppes-Sen Proofness (SSP) that embodies the Suppes-Sen principle. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008474120
We propose a new axiom, Weakest Collective Rationality (WCR) which is weaker than both Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO) in Nash (1950)’s original characterization and Strong Individual Rationality (SIR) in Roth (1977)’s characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. We then characterize the...
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Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually; two parties reach intermediate agreements without knowing the whole range of possibilities. These intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. Cooperative bargaining solutions ignore these dynamics and can therefore...
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This article proposes a simple Nash program. Both our axiomatic characterization and our noncooperative procedure consider each distinct asymmetric and symmetric Nash solution. Our noncooperative procedure is a generalization of the simplest known sequential Nash demand game analyzed by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010593102
Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually. During this process parties reach intermediate agreements. These intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. We identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by three prominent bargaining solutions, the Nash,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010593103
Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually. During this process parties reach intermediate agreements. These intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. We identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by three prominent bargaining solutions, the Nash,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049666