When is it optimal for a government to default on its legal repayment obligations? We answer this question for a small open economy with domestic production risk in which contracting frictions make it optimal for the government to finance itself by issuing non-contingent debt. We show that...

When is it optimal for a government to default on its legal repayment oblig- ations? We answer this question for a small open economy with domestic production risk in which the government optimally finances itself by issuing non-contingent debt. We show that Ramsey optimal policies occasionally...

In this paper we examine the effect of collateral requirements on the prices of long-lived assets. We consider a Lucas-style infinite-horizon exchange economy with heterogeneous agents and collateral constraints. There are two trees in the economy which can be used as collateral for short-term...

Many assets derive their value not only from future cash flows but also from their ability to serve as collateral. In this paper, we investigate this collateral value and its impact on asset returns in an infinite-horizon general equilibrium model with heterogeneous agents facing collateral...

In this paper we examine the quantitative effects of margin regulation on volatility in asset markets. We consider a general equilibrium in finite-horizon economy with heterogeneous agents and collateral constraints. There are two assets in the economy which can be used as collateral for...

We investigate whether frictions in US financial markets amplify the international propagation of US financial shocks. The dynamics of the US economy is modeled jointly with global macroeconomic and financial variables using a threshold vector autoregression that allows us to capture...