This paper studies the implications of agents signaling their moral type in a lying game. In the theoretical analysis …, a signaling motive emerges where agents dislike being suspected of lying and where some types of liars are more … particular on partial lying, where some agents dishonestly report a non payoff-maximizing report. I discuss the relationship with …

We investigate the influence of self and social image concerns as potential sources of lying costs. In a standard die …-rolling experiment, we exogenously manipulate self-awareness and observability, which mediate the focus of a person on their private and …. This suggests that self-image concerns may be less important than previously hypothesized in the literature on lying costs …

empirically in a large scale online experiment and in the laboratory. In both experiments, the second mover's lying propensity …Recent literature has shown that lying behavior in the laboratory can well be explained by a combination of lying costs … and reputation concerns. We extend the literature on lying behavior to strategic interactions. As reciprocal behavior is …