This paper provides a critical re-examination of Rubinstein's survey (Rubinstein; Economic Journal 2006), in which he questions the way economics is taught. The observations obtained in our new survey cast some doubts on the original findings, and, in particular, question Rubinstein's conjecture...

Many papers have reported behavioral biases in belief formation that come on top of standard game-theoretic reasoning. We show that the processes involved depend on the way participants reason about their beliefs. When they think about what everybody else or another "unspecified" individual is...

Many people implicitly sell or give away their data when using online services and participating in loyalty programmes-despite growing concerns about company's use of private data. Our paper studies potential reasons and co-variates that contribute to resolving this apparent paradox, which has...

Belief elicitation is important in many different fields of economic research. We show that how a researcher elicits such beliefs-in particular, whether the belief is about the participant's opponent, an unrelated other, or the population of others-affects the processes involved in the formation...

I show that whether participants generally believe in others’ preference stability is a crucial determinant of behaviour. Whether a participant’s behaviour can be predicted by her best-response or a Nash-equilibrium in a context where she can observe others' elicited preferences depends...

We experimentally show that current models of reciprocity are in-complete in a systematic way using a new variant of the ultimatumgame that provides second-movers with a marginal-cost-free punish-ment option. For a substantial proportion of the population, the de-gree of first-mover unkindness...