Showing 1 - 10 of 63
We consider the contracting problem of a principal who faces an agent with private information and cannot commit to not renegotiate a chosen contract. To analyze this problem, we propose an infinite horizon negotiation protocol in which renegotiation is frictionless, executed without delay and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301660
We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer s preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a precise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329309
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011629242
We analyze the problem of a buyer who chooses a supplier for a long-term relationship via an auction. The buyer lacks commitment to not renegotiate the terms of the contract in the long run. Thus, suppliers are cautious about the information revealed during the auction. We show theoretically and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012056159
We analyze the problem of a buyer who purchases a long-term project from one of several suppliers. A changing state of the world influences the costs of the suppliers. Complete contracts conditioning on all future realizations of the state are infeasible. We show that contractual incompleteness...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012105660
We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946258
Bidding in first-price auctions crucially depends on the beliefs of the bidders about their competitors' willingness to pay. We analyze bidding behavior in a first-price auction in which the knowledge of the bidders about the distribution of their competitors' valuations is restricted to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946260
The usual analysis of bidding in first-price auctions assumes that bidders know the distribution of valuations. We analyze first-price auctions in which bidders do not know the precise distribution of their competitors' valuations, but only the mean of the distribution. We propose a novel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014537021
Die Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) veröffentlichte am 21. Juni 2021 ein Szenarienpapier, das sich mit Grundsätzen der zukünftigen Bereitstellung von Mobilfunkfrequenzen mit einem besonderen Fokus auf die Verbesserung der Breitbandversorgung befasst. Das ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014286948
Durch die Gasspeicherregelungen soll die Versorgungssicherheit im Winter erhöht werden. Ausschreibungen und direkte Beschaffung durch den Marktgebietsverantwortlichen sollen die Befüllung der Gasspeicher sicherstellen. Beide Instrumente können zu einer Verdrängung von anderen Speichermengen...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014289961